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AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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*Asst. Chief for Intel Dev.*  
*Dept. of Army*  
*Wash DC 20310*  
*attn: OT-RD D C*

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HEADQUARTERS  
27TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION (TRUCK)  
APO 96238

AVCA QN-TG-27-CO

13 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65), for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

## SECTION 1. SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

### 1. General:

a. The 27th Transportation Battalion (Truck) continued tactical and direct support operations as well as local and line haul truck operations for 89 days of this quarter. The Battalion moved 138,861 short tons of cargo, 15,330,000 gallons of POL, and 250 passengers while traveling 3,293,358 miles.

b. During this period, the 27th Transportation Battalion radically changed its structure. The 444th Transportation Company (Light Truck) returned to the Qui Nhon area from Pleiku where it conducted resupply operations of forward support areas. The 28th Transportation Platoon, the GOER Transportation Company (Provisional) and the 61st and 359th Transportation Companies (Petrol) were detached from this headquarters.

c. In April of this period, the 27th Transportation Battalion Headquarters and three (3) attached companies moved to a permanent Battalion Compound located in Valley "A", Qui Nhon.

### 2. Personnel:

a. During this period, the 61st Transportation Company (Petrol) and the 359th Transportation Company (Petrol) were released from attachment to the 8th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) and attached to the 58th Field Depot effective 1 April 1967 by General Order No. 48, HQ, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon dated 28 March 1967.

b. The 28th Transportation Platoon (Light Truck) was detached and assigned to the 45th General Support Group located in Pleiku, effective 17 February 1967 per General Order No. 20, HQ, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon.

c. The GOER Transportation Company (Provisional) was likewise detached and assigned to the Pleiku Sub Area Command on 17 February per General Order No. 20, HQ, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon.

d. This period saw the beginning of a tremendous turn over of personnel in all units attached to the battalion. To offset the effect of this rotational hump in any one company, approximately 150 men were transferred between units in the battalion.

e. During this period, many critical personnel shortages developed in the battalion primarily with cooks, mechanics, and drivers. During 89 days of this period, gains compared with losses are as follows:

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	<u>GAINS</u>	<u>LOSSES</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u>
Cooks	3	18	15
Mechanics	17	49	32
Drivers	302	382	80

### 3. Operations:

a. On 1 April 1967, the battalion relinquished control of the 61st and 359th Transportation Companies. These units were attached to the 58th Field Depot to facilitate POL movement. This change did not significantly affect the general cargo movement capability of the battalion.

b. During the period, operational requirements increased. Beach clearance, to include drive-away and through-put from ship to line haul and to various locations throughout the Main Depot greatly expanded the battalion operational requirements.

c. The supplementary afternoon convoy to Pleiku was continued throughout the period. This convoy, in addition to the regularly scheduled morning convoy enabled the battalion to move greater tonnage throughout the day.

d. The semi-trailers of the battalion used in the support of tactical forces in the Pleiku area were involved extensively in thru-put operations. An average of 50% of all semi-trailers are delivered directly to Division bases or unit areas without going through depot clearance.

e. In April 1967, 2½ ton vehicles of the battalion supported ROK Artillery units south of Qui Nhon, who in turn supported Operation OZAK KYO.

f. The 27th Transportation vehicles continued to support task forces in the Bong Son, Phu Cat area which are in direct support of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

### 4. Training and Organization:

#### a. Training:

(1) Drivers training program has been resumed at the battalion level to qualify the large number of replacements that arrived during this period.

(2) A battalion training program has been initiated to present mandatory subjects to all personnel. Training schedules and lesson plans are in effect.

(3) Increased emphasis has been placed on OJT of all drivers concerning operators maintenance. Each unit daily conducts a one hour period of supervised motor stables.

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13 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for  
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b. Organization: At the close of the period the following units were attached to the battalion:

- (1) 2nd Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (Composite)
- (2) 58th Transportation Company (Light Truck) (2½ Ton)
- (3) 64th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (Cargo)
- (4) 444th Transportation Company (Light Truck) (2½ Ton)
- (5) 597th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) (Cargo)

5. Intelligence and Security:

a. Intelligence: This organization assisted in the collection of intelligence data by means of prompt and accurate submission of intelligence spot reports as incidents occurred. This headquarters has installed a formal repository system based on 1st Logistical Command Regulation 335-3.

b. Security: The 27th Transportation Battalion, due to its move in April, has been constantly striving to increase the security in the new area. The Battalion Headquarters has assumed the sector security responsibility for all units located in Valley "A", OPLANS have been prepared, and significant security coordination has been effected within the sector.

6. Logistics:

All International Harvester Commercial 5-ton tractors have been replaced with M52A2 series tractors. All medium and light units presently have complete TOE strengths of vehicles. The International Harvester vehicles did not prove successful in highway movement in the Central Highlands.

7. Maintenance:

a. Rigidly supervised first echelon maintenance has proved highly beneficial to the battalion. 24 hour operations make vehicle maintenance a continuing problem. Maintenance check lists, as well as spot checks, daily motor stables, and follow-up action on requisitions all are in effect, and receive command emphasis.

b. Main Support Company has recently instituted a contact team which visits units for field echelon repairs. This greatly assisted the battalion in controlling its deadline rate.

8. Other: None

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for  
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### SECTION 2. COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### PART 1. Observations (Lessons Learned):

##### 1. Personnel

###### Item: Rotational Hump

Discussion: Faced with losses of up to 130 men in one company during one month, it was determined that intra battalion transfers must be made to alleviate such a large loss with its incumbent operational disruption. Therefore 150 men were transferred between units of the battalion in order to arrive at a more acceptable loss ratio in any one company in any one month. This was accomplished during the month of April and the losses were reduced from approximately 70% to 35% in any one company. In addition to the rotational hump which was primarily limited to units arriving in Vietnam within the past year, normal personnel rotations has caused critical shortages in driver, cook, and mechanic MOS's.

###### Observation:

a. The immediate disruption of intra battalion transfers throughout all the companies is more acceptable and more easily over-comes than the loss of up to 70% of the personnel in one company in one month.

b. Voluntary extensions have helped to minimize the personnel shortage impact, but if replacement personnel were programmed to arrive in units in time to provide sufficient overlap, there would be a minimum of disruption in operations.

##### 2. Operations.

###### Item: Direct line haul tractor-trailer operations

Discussion: The daily tractor-trailer line haul to Pleiku is presently being reviewed for its effectiveness. A trailer shuttle relay system is being considered as a more efficient operation rather than the 200 mile daily round trip to Pleiku. It would be more efficient to shuttle trailers to An Khe, and from there, to Pleiku. Such a system would allow adequate time for vehicle maintenance in addition to moving more tonnage of cargo.

Observation: A shuttle relay system is planned, and will be in operation by 10 May 1967. The 64th Transportation Company is scheduled to move to Pleiku to operate the trailer shuttle between Pleiku and An Khe.

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### 3. Training and Organization

#### Item: Mandatory Training

Discussion: There has been a great lack of formal training and refresher training for personnel in basic mandatory subjects. Although operational commitments are paramount, such training is necessary.

Observation: Unit training schedules and lesson plans must be maintained and training conducted on a continuous basis. This procedure is presently in effect.

### 4. Intelligence and Security:

#### a. Intelligence: None

#### b. Security:

#### Item: Physical Security Materials

Discussion: The unavailability of physical security material presents an increased guard (manpower) requirement and an increased liability to hostile action or material damage. Light fixtures and power sources continue to be in short supply. Perimeter lighting can reduce passive guard requirements considerably and free needed manpower for mission essential jobs.

Observation: Increased guards, especially walking guards deemed necessary.

### 5. Logistics

#### Item: Modified TOE

Discussion: The present TOE which transportation units are organized under in this area of operations does not authorize sufficient equipment or personnel.

Observation: Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment have been prepared by this battalion for equipment and personnel required to properly perform the unit mission in the Republic of Vietnam.

### 6. Maintenance

#### Item: Right Fender Mounting Brackets on M52A2 and M52A1 Tractors

Discussion: The right fender mounting brackets are cracking on the M52A1 and M52A2 model tractors. The weight of the air cleaner on the right

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for  
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fender and the vibration from the rough roads and the cause of fender mounting brackets cracking. This defect has caused many vehicles to be dead-lined until the mounting bracket can be welded.

Observation: Units have corrected this deficiency by welding reinforced rods from the outer edge of the fender bracket to the grill. Equipment Improvement Recommendations (EIR's) have been submitted on this defect, but to date no report has been received on these recommendations.

Item: The Battalion's direct support unit (DSU) - Main Support Company, 86th Maintenance Battalion, APO 96238.

Discussion: Battalion units were losing valuable time and vehicles were being deadlined for an extra period of time because of backlog of vehicles waiting to be inspected at Main Support Company.

Observation: Main Support Company instituted a Contact Team that visits units to perform field echelon repair at the using unit level. This has greatly assisted the Battalion units in controlling their deadline and the Contact Team, by repairing vehicles at the using unit level, has kept more task vehicles on the road for line haul operations. In the course of a week, the Contact Team averages thirty-five to forty job orders at the using level, previously these job orders would have had to be performed at the field maintenance level. An estimated two days is saved per vehicle by the Main Support Team.

**PART II: RECOMMENDATIONS**

**1. Personnel:**

a. That when a serious rotational hump becomes evident, personnel be transferred within the battalion. It is judged that this situation will not arise within the next six (6) months due to the preventive steps presently taken.

**2. Operations:**

a. Main supply routes should be maintained on a priority basis to increase effectiveness of trucking operations.

b. That additional medium truck units be assigned to the Qui Nhon area so that daily line haul commitments can be met. Recently, commitments exceeded 8th Transportation Group capabilities by 500-1000 tons daily. Additional units would enable this battalion to establish a shuttle system of

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trailer movement which would provide a more effective transportation system than the present line haul concept.

3. Training and Organization:

a. All replacement personnel be adequately trained and briefed prior to departure for overseas theatres.

b. That all driver personnel arriving in the theatre be qualified as drivers upon reaching their respective units so as to utilize a minimum of time training drivers so as to meet commitments.

4. Intelligence and Security: None

5. Logistics:

a. Due to the experience gained, request that MTOE as submitted be approved.

6. Maintenance: That Maintenance Contact Teams continue to render technical assistance to units.

7. Other: None

*Philip Smiley*  
PHILIP SMILEY  
MAJ, TG  
Commanding

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AVCA QM-10 (13 May 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 6th Transportation Group (Motor Transport), APO 96238,  
19 May 1967

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, ATTN:  
AVCA QM-10, APO 96238  
Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA SO-O,  
APO 96307  
Deputy Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHSC-DN,  
APO 96307  
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CACOP-OT, APO 96550

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The attached Operational Report submitted by the 27th Transportation Battalion has been reviewed. Information contained therein is considered pertinent and complete.

2. During the period of this report the 27th Transportation Battalion was engaged in operations for 89 days.

3. The following comments on the recommendations in Section 2, Part II are submitted:

a. Personnel: Concur.

b. Operations:

(1) Concur on need for priority maintenance on main supply routes.

(2) The 585th Transportation Company (Medium Truck) is being transferred from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon, to be attached to the 27th Transportation Battalion, and will arrive on or about 20 May.

c. Training and organization: Concur.

d. Logistics: Concur.

e. Maintenance: Concur.

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*Noble E. Taylor*  
NOBLE E. TAYLOR  
Colonel, TC  
Commanding

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AVCA-QN-GO-O(13 May 67) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1967

HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON, APO SAN FRANCISCO 96238 26 MAY 1967

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O,  
APO 96307  
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN:  
AVHGC-DH, APO 96307  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-OT,  
APO 96558


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development of the Army, Washington,  
D.C. 20310

Report for the 27th Transportation Battalion (Trk) has been reviewed  
by this headquarters and is considered adequate with 1st indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

QNL 450/600

1 Incl  
nc

  
WILLIAM R. ROSS  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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1. J. J. (13 42 67) 3d 1ed  
1. J. J. Operational Report for the Quarterly Period ending 30 April 1967 (215 11302 35)

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6 JUN 1967

1. J. J. 113 11302 35 1. J. J. 26307

1. Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the 27th Transportation Battalion for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1967 is forwarded.

2. Reference paragraph 1, page 6: Concur. This is clearly the responsibility of the command concerned.

3. Reference paragraph 2a, page 6: Concur. The responsibility of keeping a road open to traffic is of highest priority. Engineer units have been very responsive in this respect. Filling of pot holes and other measures to improve the trafficability of the roads must share the much needed engineer effort with other projects. Engineer units are assigned full time to the maintenance of roads in the Binh Thon area; however, their number is not enough to upgrade the roads. A program for upgrading the roads in Vietnam has been established but it will not be complete for some time. CMC has established priorities as to which roads will be upgraded first.

4. Reference paragraph 3b, page 7: Concur. If drivers were completely trained - to include knowledge of international road signs - prior to arrival in RVN, gaining units would be able to utilize them immediately without having to establish a training program.

5. Reference paragraph 5, page 7: The present moratorium on submission of J. J. will continue to be in effect for the foreseeable future. Until the moratorium is ended, only fully-justifiable requests for emergency augmentation of personnel/equipment may be considered.

6. Concur with the basic report as modified by indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR FILE ATTACHED:

1. J. J. 782/430

Timothy S. O'Hara

TIMOTHY S. O'HARA  
1ST INF  
Acting Asst AG

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307 4 JUL 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1967 from Headquarters, 27th Transportation Battalion as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning critical personnel shortages, paragraph 2e, page 1; paragraph 1, page 4, and paragraph 1a, page 6: This headquarters assigns assets to the 1st Logistical Command who in turn assigns personnel according to their priorities. The 1st Logistical Command has been made aware of the shortages as reported by the 27th Transportation Battalion.

b. Reference item concerning physical security materials, paragraph 4b, page 5: The availability of physical security materials has improved to a marked extent. All electrical items remain in short supply; however, procurement action is underway to alleviate these shortages. This material should be available for issue in 2d Quarter, FY 68.

c. Reference item concerning modified TOE, paragraph 5, page 5: Concur with comments of paragraph 5, 1st Logistical Command 3d Indorsement. 1st Logistical Command has been notified that if an emergency exists in the unit, an MTOE may be submitted at any time, and that if an emergency does not exist, MTOE should be submitted upon termination of the DA moratorium on submission of MTOE.

d. Reference item concerning replacement personnel, paragraph 3a, page 7: Concur. Recommend that CONARC make replacement personnel training an item of interest for annual AGI.

e. Reference item concerning driver personnel, paragraph 3b page 7 and paragraph 4, 3d Indorsement: Concur. Recommend CONARC require that all replacement drivers for RVN receive instruction on identification of international road signs and driving conditions in RVN.

f. Reference item concerning main supply routes, paragraph 2a, page 6; and paragraph 3, 3d Indorsement: A program for the maintenance and upgrading of principle LOC's has been developed and work is currently being performed by US and ARVN engineer units, Ministry of Public works, and contractors. Approximately 15% of the non-divisional engineer effort

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
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available to USARV is being applied to this construction. Progress is being monitored by USARV to insure that the level of effort does not fall below 15% which has been determined to be the minimum necessary for the expeditious prosecution of the program.

g. Reference item concerning maintenance contact teams, page 6, and paragraph 6, page 7: Concur. This is an excellent example of COSTAR philosophy.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
nc

  
E. L. KENNEDY  
Cpt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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
GPOP-DT(13 May 67) 5th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
30 April 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 27th Trans Bn (Trk)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 3 AUG 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



G. L. McMULLIN  
MAJ, AGC  
Asst AG


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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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